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Robust Detection of Biasing Attacks on Misappropriated Distributed
Observers via Decentralized H∞ synthesis
V. Ugrinovskii
Abstract— We develop a decentralized H∞ synthesis ap-
proach to detection of biasing misappropriation attacks on
distributed observers. Its starting point is to equip the observer
with an attack model which is then used in the design of attack
detectors. A two-step design procedure is proposed. First, an
initial centralized setup is carried out which enables each node
to compute the parameters of its attack detector online in a
decentralized manner, without interacting with other nodes.
Each such detector is designed using the H∞ approach. Next,
the attack detectors are embedded into the network, which
allows them to detect misappropriated nodes from innovation
in the network interconnections.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need to protect control systems from malicious attacks
has led to an emergence of methodologies for resilient con-
trol. Resilient control schemes intend to enhance tolerance
of control systems to attacks. The interest in the resilience
problem has increased substantially after situations were
discovered where an adversary was able to compromise
integrity of a control system by injecting a malicious input
into the measurements, which was not detected by bad data
detection units [2].
Cooperative networked control systems are particularly
vulnerable to such attacks. For instance, in networks of ob-
servers [4] fidelity of information is crucial, it makes possible
estimation of the plant even when it cannot be reliably esti-
mated from local measurements. A misappropriated observer
node can provide a false information to its neighbours, and
use them to bias the entire network. On the other hand, as this
paper shows, information sharing between network nodes
provides opportunities for monitoring integrity of distributed
filter networks.
This paper considers the problem of detection of malicious
attacks, known as biasing attacks [10], on distributed state
observers. The problem was posed originally in [3], it is
motivated by the necessity to enhance resilience properties of
a general class of distributed state estimation networks such
as those introduced in [5], [7], [11], [14]. It is concerned
with a situation where one of the observers in the network is
misappropriated and is used to supply a biased information
to its neighbours.
While we adopt the same bias injection attack model
as in [3] and are concerned with detecting the same bias-
ing behaviour of misappropriated nodes (also cf. [9]), our
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approach to the synthesis of attack detectors is different
from [3]. It is based on the decoupling technique developed
in [15]. This allows us to dispense with several difficulties
of the vector dissipativity approach adopted in [3]. First
and foremost, our approach provides the observer nodes
with a better computational autonomy. In this paper, the
process of computing the characteristics of an attack detector
at each node is independent of other nodes. Although an
initial centralized setup is required for this, it involves only
characteristics of the communication network, and can be
completed without knowledge of the system and the filter
characteristics. This contrasts our results with the technique
in [3] where the design conditions are coupled. As a by-
product of decentralization, our technique applies to more
general time-varying distributed filters. It also brings several
other improvements, which simplify tuning the detector. At
the same time, the proposed scheme retains advantages of
the attack detection scheme developed in [3]. It is robust
against uncertainties in the sensors and the plant model and
relies on the same sensory and interconnection data as the
networked observer it seeks to protect.
The paper begins with presenting a biasing attack model
from [3] and also gives a background on the distributed
filtering in Section II, respectively. Section III presents the
problem formulation and our main results, which allow
one to construct a collaborative attack detector. The design
technique is described in Section IV. The conclusions are
given in Section V.
Notation: Rn denotes the real Euclidean n-dimensional
vector space, with the norm ‖x‖ = (x′x)1/2; here the symbol
′ denotes the transpose of a matrix or a vector. The symbol
I denotes the identity matrix. For real symmetric n × n
matrices X and Y , Y > X (respectively, Y ≥ X) means
the matrix Y −X is positive definite (respectively, positive
semidefinite). The notation L2[0,∞) refers to the Lebesgue
space ofRn-valued vector-functions z(.), defined on the time
interval [0,∞), with the norm ‖z‖2 ,
(∫
∞
0
‖z(t)‖2dt
)1/2
and the inner product
∫
∞
0
z′1(t)z2(t)dt.
II. BIASING MISAPPROPRIATION ATTACKS ON
DISTRIBUTED OBSERVERS
A distributed observer problem under consideration in-
volves estimation of the state of a time varying plant
x˙ = A(t)x +B(t)w, x(0) = x0, (1)
subject to an unknown modeling disturbance w, from a
collection of measurements
yi = Ci(t)x+Di(t)vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2)
taken at N nodes of a sensor network, and also affected
by measurement disturbances vi. The distributed estimation
problem requires that the measurements are to be processed
at the sensor nodes, rather than centrally. For this, sensors-
observers are interconnected into a network, so that the
constituent nodes can share their pre-processed data and can
enhance their local estimates of the plant state.
To describe the problem mathematically, let us assume that
the state x and the disturbance w are respectively in Rn,
R
m, and each measurement yi is in R
pi . The disturbances
w and vi ∈ R
mi will be assumed L2 integrable on [0,∞).
The initial state x0 is also unknown. A typical distributed
estimation problem involves constructing a network of filters
of the form
˙ˆxi = A(t)xˆi + Li(t)(yi − Ci(t)xˆi)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)(cij −Wij xˆi), xˆi(0) = ξi, (3)
each generating an estimate xˆi(t) of the plant state x(t) using
its measurement yi and the information received from the
neighbours, in the form of a pij-dimensional signal
cij = Wij xˆj +Hijvij , j ∈ Ni; (4)
here Ni denotes the neighbourhood of agent i, i.e., the set
of network nodes that communicate their information to i.
Since the plant is time-varying, the filter coefficients Li, Kij
are allowed to be time-varying as well.
The matrices Wij determine which part of the vector xˆj
is made available to node i by node j. Typically, distributed
observers are required where the plant may not be detectable
from local measurements at some of the nodes, and the
signals cij serve to complement the local measurements
with an additional information. Mathematically, to obtain an
unbiased estimate of x, node i may require a portion of xˆj
which lies in the subspace of states undetectable from yi.
The matrix Wij can be thought of as ‘projecting’ xˆj onto
that subspace. However, the communication channels which
deliver this information are typically subject to disturbances;
this is reflected in the term Hijvij in (4).
The problem is to determine estimator gains Li and Kij
in (3) to ensure that each estimate xˆi (or a part of it)
converges to x(t) in some sense, and that some filtering
performance against disturbances is guaranteed. On the other
hand, an adversary may seek to prevent this from happening.
A common means for interfering with a normal operation of
the system involve injecting false data into the measurements
or communications [6], however consideration is also given
to misappropriation attacks where adversary gains control
over the control algorithm and modifies it according to its
strategic goals [8]. In line with this idea, in [3] we considered
a situation where the attacker interferes with dynamics of
the hijacked node by injecting a biasing input into the filter.
In this paper we extend this model to consider a similar
type of attack on the network of time-varying observers (3).
Specifically, we consider the situation where the adversary
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Fig. 1. An auxiliary ‘input tracking’ model.
substitutes one or several observers (3) with
˙ˆxi = A(t)xˆi + Li(t)(yi(t)− Ci(t)xˆi)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)(cij −Wij xˆi) + Fifi, xˆi(0) = ξi, (5)
Here Fi ∈ R
n×nfi is a constant matrix and fi ∈ R
nfi
is the unknown signal representing an attack input. In the
following, we will present an algorithm for detecting and
tracking these unknown inputs.
Following [3], we will consider a class of attacks on the
filter (5) consisting of biasing inputs fi(t) of the form
fi(t) = fi1(t) + fi2(t), (6)
where the Laplace transform of fi1(t), fi1(s), is such that
supω |ωfi1(jω)|
2 <∞ and fi2 ∈ L2[0,∞). It can be shown
that one can select a proper nfi×nfi transfer function Gi(s)
for which the system in Fig. 1 is stable and has the property∫
∞
0
‖fi − fˆi‖
2dt <∞, (7)
which holds for all inputs that admit decomposition (6). In
particular, bias injection attack inputs of the form ‘constant
+ an exponentially decaying transient’ generated by a low
pass filter introduced in [10] have the form (6), and therefore
can be ‘tracked’ using a system shown in Fig. 1. Of course,
in reality it is not possible to track covert attack inputs.
However, the model in Fig. 1 is useful in that it allows us
to associate with the class of biasing attack inputs a system
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi, ǫi(0) = 0, (8)
fˆi = Υiǫi,
where νi = fˆi − fi is an L2-integrable input, according to
(7).
In practice, the transfer function Gi(s) must be selected
by the designer according to an anticipated behaviour of the
attack inputs fi(t). For example, for the mentioned class of
bias injection attacks of the form ‘constant + an exponentially
decaying transient’, one can choose Gi(s) to be a first
order low pass filter, Gi(s) =
gi
s+2βi
I . The corresponding
coefficients of the system (8) then take the form
Ωi =
[
0 I
0 −2βiI
]
, Γi =
[
0
−gi
]
, Υi = [I 0]. (9)
The choice of the transfer functions Gi(s) and the cor-
responding system (8) will affect performance of the attack
detectors to be introduced later in the paper. For instance,
in the above example, selecting βi, gi enables tuning the
performance of the attack detectors.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
First, let us summarize the information which the observer
nodes can utilize to detect an attack. Each node has two
innovation signals available,
ζi = yi − Ci(t)xˆi
= Ci(t)(x − xˆi) +Di(t)vi, (10)
ζij = cij −Wij xˆi. (11)
The innovation ζi symbolizes the new information contained
in the measurement acquired by node i, compared with its
own prediction of that information. Likewise, the innovation
ζij symbolizes the new information contained in the message
that node i receives from its neighbour j ∈ Ni. Similar
to [3], these innovations will play an instrumental role in
detecting a rogue behaviour of misappropriated nodes. Both
signals are readily available at node i; computing them
only requires the local measurement yi and the neighbour
messages cij . j ∈ Ni, available at node i, along with xˆi; see
(5).
The problem of detecting a biasing attack of the form (6)
on the observer network comprised of observers (5) consists
in designing a network of attack detectors
µ˙i = Ad(t)µi + Ld,i(t)(ζi −Wd,iµi)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kd,ij(t)(ζij −Wd,ij(µj − µi)), (12)
ϕi = Cd,iµi, µi(0) = µi,0,
which guarantee that
∫ +∞
0
‖ϕi − fi‖
2dt < +∞. (13)
Here, Ad(t), Ld,i(t), Kd,ij(t), Wd,i, Wd,ij , Cd,i are matrix
valued coefficients to be found.
According to (13), the output of each detector subsystem
(12) is required to track fi in the L2 sense. This makes
these outputs suitable as indicators of the biasing attack. Note
that each detector relies on the information received from its
neighbouring nodes contained in the innovation signals ζij .
IV. DESIGN OF ATTACK DETECTORS
Define the estimation error at node i, ei = x−xˆi. It follows
from (1), (5) that the dynamics of this error are described by
e˙i = (A(t)− Li(t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wij)ei
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wijej +B(t)w − Li(t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Hijvij − Fifi, ei(0) = x0 − ξi.(14)
Using the representation of the attack input fi = Υiǫi − νi
and (8), the input fi can be eliminated from (14). This will
result in the following extended system:
e˙i = (A(t)− Li(t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wij)ei
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wijej − FiΥiǫi +B(t)w − Li(t)Di(t)vi
−
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Hijvij + Fiνi, ei(0) = x0 − ξi,
ǫ˙i = Ωiǫi + Γiνi ǫi(0) = 0. (15)
Also, using (10), (11), define outputs of the extended system
(15) as
ζi = Ci(t)ei +Divi, (16)
ζij = −Wij(ej − ei) +Hijvij , j ∈ Ni. (17)
These outputs are available at each node of the network
and will be used as inputs to an attack detector, whose
function is to estimate the state of the system (15) and
generate an output ϕi that converges to fˆi and fi while
attenuating the disturbances.
The observer which we propose below for estimating
the combined state (ei, ǫi) of this system is a time-varying
version of the observer introduced in [3]. This observer is as
follows:
˙ˆei = (A(t) − Li(t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wij)eˆi
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kij(t)Wij eˆj − FiΥiǫˆi
+ L¯i(ζi − Ci(t)eˆi) +
∑
j∈Ni
K¯ij(t)(ζij −Wij(eˆi − eˆj)),
˙ˆǫi = Ωiǫˆi + Lˇi(ζi − Cieˆi)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Kˇij(t)(ζij −Wij(eˆi − eˆj)),
ϕi = Υiǫˆi, eˆi(0) = 0, ǫˆi(0) = 0. (18)
From now, our effort is directed towards finding a construc-
tive method for computing the coefficients of this observer.
We seek to obtain the gains L¯i(t), K¯ij(t), Lˇi(t), Kˇij(t) such
that the output ϕi of each filter (18) converges to fi. This
will establish the filters (18) as biasing attack detectors. The
inputs to the observer (18) are innovation signals (10), (11).
Despite the similarity between the filter (18) and the filter
introduced in [3] for the similar task, the time-varying nature
of the problem under consideration requires us to revisit
the design method obtained in [3]. The design conditions
proposed in [3] involve solving certain coupled linear matrix
inequalities. Although similar inequalities can be derived for
the problem considered here, they will involve derivatives
of the vector storage functions and will therefore be dif-
ferential matrix inequalities, with time-varying coefficients.
Such inequalities are very difficult to solve, even using
centralized solver facilities. For this reason, here we develop
an alternative technique for computing the coefficients of
the observer (18). Although our task of selecting the gains
L¯i, K¯ij , Lˇi, Kˇij so that the observer (18) attenuates the
L2-integrable disturbances w, vi, vij , νi, while guaranteeing
L2 convergence and an H∞ performance of the distributed
attack detector, remains unchanged we propose a different
technique which suits time-varying problems such as the one
considered here. The idea of this technique is to decentralize
the design process (but not the detectors themselves) to make
it tractable.
To explain the decentralized design of the attack detector,
let zi = ei − eˆi, δi = ǫi − ǫˆi be estimation errors of the
observer (18). It is easy to see from (18) that these errors
evolve according to the equations
z˙i = (A(t) − Lˆi(t)Ci(t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Kˆij(t)Wij)zi − FiΥiδi
−
∑
j∈Ni
Kˆij(t)(Wijzj +Hijvij) +Bw
−Lˆi(t)Di(t)vi + Fiνi,
δ˙i = Ωiδi − Lˇi(t)Ci(t)zi −
∑
j∈Ni
Kˇij(t)Wijzi + Γiνi
−
∑
j∈Ni
Kˇij(t)(Wijzj +Hijvij) (19)
zi(0) = x0 − ξi, δi(0) = 0.
Here we used the notation Lˆi = Li + L¯i, Kˆij = Kij + K¯i.
Also, let us introduce signals
ηij = Wijzj, j ∈ Ni. (20)
Altogether, for each node i, qi such signals are introduced,
where qi is the cardinality of the set Ni, also known as in-
degree of node i. Each signal ηij is of dimension pij , i.e., it
matches the dimension of the corresponding communication
signal cij . The signals ηij serve as interconnection signals
for the large-scale system (19). Then the error system (19)
can be written as
d
dt
λi = (Ai(t)− Li(t)Ci(t))λi +B(t)
[
w
νi
]
−Li(t)Di(t)

 viv¯i
η¯i

 , (21)
where we used the following notation:
λi =
[
zi
δi
]
, v¯i =
[
v′ij1 . . . v
′
ijqi
]′
,
η¯i =
[
(Z
−1/2
ij1
ηij1)
′ . . . (Z
−1/2
ijqi
ηijqi )
′
]′
,
Ai(t) =
[
A(t) −FiΥi
0 Ωi
]
, Bi =
[
B(t) Fi
0 Γi
]
,
Ci(t) =


Ci(t) 0
Wij1 0
...
...
Wijqi 0

 , Li =
[
Lˆi Kˆij1 . . . Kˆijqi
Lˇi Kˇij1 . . . Kˇijqi
]
,(22)
Di(t) =


Di(t) 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 Hij1 . . . 0 Z
1/2
ij1
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Hijqi 0 . . . Z
1/2
ijqi

 .
Here Zij i = 1, . . . , N , j ∈ Ni are certain square pij × pij
positive definite matrices. It will be assumed that each matrix
Ei(t) = Di(t)Di
′(t) is positive definite for all t.
The system (21) can be regarded as an uncertain system
affected by the disturbances w, vi, vij and signals νi,
Z
−1/2
ij ηij . The latter signals will be treated as fictitious
disturbances. This allows us to apply the H∞ filtering theory
to obtain a gain coefficient Li(t) which guarantees that the
impact of the disturbances on the errors zi, δi is attenuated.
Introduce collection of positive definite (n+ nfi)× (n+
nfi) block-diagonal matrices Ri,Xi, i = 1 . . . , N , parti-
tioned as
Ri =
[
Ri 0
0 Rˇi
]
, Xi =
[
Xi 0
0 Xˇi
]
,
with n× n matrices Ri, Xi and nfi × nfi matrices Rˇi, Xˇi.
In addition, define the matrix
Φ = [Φij ]
N
i,j=1, (23)
composed of the blocks
Φij =


∆i, i = j,
−W ′ijU
−1
ij Wij , i 6= j, j ∈ Ni,
0 i 6= j, j 6∈ Ni,
where
Uij = HijH
′
ij + Zij , ∆i =
∑
j∈Ni
W ′ijU
−1
ij ZijU
−1
ij Wij .
Also, let
R = diag[R1, . . . , RN ], ∆ = diag[∆1, . . . ,∆N ].
Theorem 1: Suppose there exists a constant γ > 0 and
positive definite symmetric matrices Ri, Rˇi, Zij , j ∈ Ni,
i = 1, . . .N , such that
(i) the following linear matrix inequalities are satisfied
R+ γ2(Φ + Φ′ −∆) > I, (24)
Rˇi > I; (25)
(ii) each differential Riccati equation
Y˙i = AiYi +YiA
′
i
−Yi(C
′
iE
−1
i Ci −
1
γ2
Ri)Yi +BiB
′
i, (26)
Yi(0) = X
−1
i ,
has a positive definite symmetric bounded solution
Yi(t) on the interval [0,∞), i.e., for all t ≥ 0, α1I <
Yi(t) = Y
′
i(t) < α2I , for some α1,2 > 0.
Then the network of observers (18) with the coefficients L¯i,
K¯ij , Lˇi, Kˇij , obtained by partitioning the matrices
Li(t) = Yi(t)Ci(t)
′
E
−1
i (t). (27)
according to (22), guarantees that the noise- and attack-free
system (19) is exponentially stable, while in the presence of
disturbances or an attack it holds that∫ +∞
0
‖ϕi − fi‖
2dt <∞ ∀i.
The proof of the theorem is removed for brevity.
Remark 1: It follows from Theorem 1 that zi ∈ L2[0,∞),
therefore every signal ηij defined in (20) is L2-integrable.
This allows us to conclude that every observer (21) has a
local disturbance attenuation property. Specifically, according
to the H∞ filtering theory [1] it follows from the condition
(ii) of Theorem 1 that
∫ T
0
(z′iRizi + δ
′
iRˇiδi)dt
≤ γ2
(
‖x0 − ξi‖
2
Xi +
∫ T
0
[
‖w‖2 + ‖vi‖
2
+
∑
j∈Ni
(‖vij‖
2 + ‖Wijzj‖
2
Z−1
ij
)
]
dt
)
(28)
This condition reveals the role of the matricesRi, Rˇi and Zij
included in the Riccati equation (26) as design parameters.
These matrices weigh the output error of the observer (19)
at node i against the information about the errors at the
neighbouring nodes which supply information to node i.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper has proposed a decentralized H∞ synthesis
method for the design of distributed observers for detecting
biasing attacks on distributed filter networks. The proposed
detectors can pick a biasing attack from local sensory in-
formation complemented with information extracted form
the routine information exchange within the network. Our
method accounts for the fact that such filters operate in noisy
environments, therefore H∞ performance of the proposed
detectors against disturbances is also guaranteed.
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